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In this paper a comparison of the two planned networks that appear in watershed planning docu-
ments for the Lake Champlain basin in 2010 One plan (2010 TMDL) was developed by a regulatory 
network initiated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and state legisla-
ture. The second plan (2010 OFA) was developed by a watershed partnership network spanning the 
governmental, nonprofit, and business sectors. This paper asks if these two planning networks reify 
themselves in the plans they create? The extent to which the structural and functional properties of the 
networks in this study are mirrored in the plans that they produce is measured. Using textual data min-
ing techniques and institutional network analysis the authors examine measures of network centrality, 
develop a visual analysis of network structures and clusters, and examine statistical comparisons of 
the task structures found across the two planned networks. 
Institutional isomorphism theory is used to anticipate and explain any mirroring effects ob-
served in the data. A comparison of policy tool identification, actor characteristics, and task 
structures for each plan is rendered. Findings suggest evidence of structural isomorphism, but not 
policy tool isomorphism occurring between the two planning regimes and possible explanations 
for these findings are given.
Key words: network governance, policy tools, partnership networks, regulatory networks, 
institutional isomorphism
Those who have charted the trajectory of environmental policy and governance in 
democratic societies have noted the growing role that multi-institutional networks have 
played in carrying out a wide range of policy functions (Durant, Fiorino, & O’Leary, 2004; 
Gerlak, 2006). The environmental network literature has included studies of networks 
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that address certain collective action problems (Ostrom, 1990, 2007; Lubell, 2004), net-
works operating as advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, Leach, Lubell, & Pelkey, 2005; Sabatier, 
Weible, & Ficker, 2005), networks designed to regulate behavior through the execution 
of hierarchical, command and control ties (Fiorino, 2006; Coglianese, 2001), watershed 
governance networks (Imperial, 2005) and thick descriptions of environmental partner-
ships (Koontz et al., 2004; Imperial, 1999, 2005; Leach & Sabatier, 2005). Across this 
literature, at least two kinds of environmental networks have been said to persist: those 
kinds of environmental networks that carry out regulatory functions through command 
and control, hierarchically aligned ties that are used to direct collective action, and those 
environmental networks that tend to rely on partnership, collaborative and horizontal ties 
to collaborate for collective action (Fiorino, 2006).
To date, little has been done to advance the field’s capacity to compare the properties 
of a regulatory network to a partnership network that are both charged with addressing the 
same environmental problem, covering the same geographic landscape, and encompassing 
similar jurisdictions during the same timeframe. In this study, the regulatory and partnership 
networks to be compared share a common policy function: the development of comprehen-
sive plans that are designed to reduce the levels of phosphorus loading into Lake Champlain. 
Furthermore, understanding how and why the structural and functional prosperities of 
different types of governance networks enable or temper experimentation and innovation 
has been noted as being of critical importance for practicing public administrators, research-
ers and theorists (Rhodes, 2007). In this study, the capacity of regulatory and partnership 
networks to experiment and innovate is observed through the comparison of policy plans 
generated by each network. Specifically, this study examines whether the regulatory and 
partnership networks responsible for the 2010 Total Maximum Daily Loading (TMDL) plan 
and 2010 Opportunities for Action (OFA) plan respectively replicate their internal gover-
nance structures into the planned networks that they create. This process of translation of 
process-based elements of organizational dynamics into static representations of organi-
zational form and function is described here as “reification” (Wenger, 1998). The theory 
of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) is drawn on to anticipate and 
explain the transmission of the governance structures of planning networks into the plans 
they reproduce. Two hypotheses are proposed that examine the isomorphic properties of the 
planned network structures (H1) and the designation of policy tools in these two plans (H2).
To study the properties of the networks produced in the plans textual data mining 
techniques (Merkl, 2000) are used to render a comparative institutional network analysis 
of the two sets of networks. Methods for identifying policy tools, the actors designated for 
initiating and carrying out specific policy tasks, and the task structures themselves are ad-
vanced. Standard measures of network density, visual analysis of network structures and 
clusters, and statistical comparisons of the task structures found across the two planned 
networks are produced and used to provide basic descriptions of plan properties and to 
critically examine the two hypotheses. 
This article begins with an articulation of the two governance network isomorphism 
hypothesis used in this study and introduce the conceptual framework used to study them. 
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The methods employed in this study are then discussed. The regulatory and partnership 
networks responsible for producing the two plans are presented, followed by a detailed 
account of each plan’s properties. The paper concludes with an analysis of the two hypoth-
eses and some implications for further theory development and research.
1. Governance Network Isomorphism Hypotheses Testing 
Institutional isomorphism has been defined as, “a constraining process that forces 
one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 149). The use of institutional isomorphism 
theory in public administration and policy studies literature has been generally relegated 
to the studies of the organization serving as the unit of analysis (Ashworth, Boyne, & 
Delbridge, 2009; Frumkin & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Villadsen, 2013). These applications 
of isomorphism theory to public sector organizations add contextual richness, but do not 
explain isomorphic tendencies across institutional structures of a higher, more complex 
order of scale: the multi-organizational network.
This present study shifts the unit of analysis in isomorphism theory from the single 
institution to a multi-institutional, multi-sector network context. By expanding the unit 
of analysis to encompass actors spanning many levels of governmental, private and non-
profit actors, an opportunity to capture the relationship between policy tool selection and 
governance structure is provided. In another study, Villadsen (2011) suggests that public 
governance networks are sources of isomorphic pressure unto themselves, and that net-
work structures of particular form can either increase or decrease isomorphic tendencies. 
He pays particular attention to the role of elected officials as pollinators of network form 
and function. This study builds on this line of research. The central question to be asked 
in this study is: Do environmental planning networks tend to reify themselves in the plans 
they create? 
Drawing on distinctions found within the environmental governance and environmental 
partnership literature, this study distinguishes between regulatory and partnership networks 
and treats these distinctions as dependent variables. Regulatory networks are predominantly 
shaped by hierarchical relationships between regulators and those that are regulated, be they 
industries, organizations and institutions, or individuals. Fiorino describes how these hierar-
chical ties function: “Regulatory agencies issue rules that are binding on defined classes of 
entities. Agencies create a system of inspections and reporting to monitor compliance with 
their rules. Entities that fail to comply are subject to penalties” (1999, p. 7).
Translating hierarchical ties into networks structures, we find regulatory networks 
dominated by hierarchical ties, appearing as mono-centric network structures, character-
ized by a singular network hub with the “regulator” at the center serving as the principal 
over its regulated agents. Within the context of environmental regulation of water quality, 
a regulatory network is established on principal-agent ties through which federal agencies 
set benchmarks and call on state agencies to adopt suitable management plans to address 
environmental problems. In the case of study undertaken here, regulation is carried out 
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by the USEPA and the Vermont Agency for Natural Resources (VT ANR) under policy 
objectives and directives stated within the nonpoint source pollution amendments to the 
Clean Water Act in 1987. The USEPA is then obligated to require the State to plan and 
implement actions (usually through the form of a Total Maximum Daily Load [TMDL]) 
to achieve the state standard for that water body.  The regulatory network in this study is 
responsible for developing, and ultimately implementing, federal level USEPA directed 
TMDL standards for the Vermont portion of the Lake Champlain Basin. The regulatory 
plan to be studied here is the 2010 Vermont Lake Champlain Basin TMDL Plan. 
In contrast to the more top down regulatory framework, environmental partnership 
networks are collaboratively governed (Ansell & Gash, 2007) and structured through 
mostly voluntary ties built on reputation, trust, and norms of reciprocity. In this study, we 
refer to these as partnership networks that often appear as polycentric, and often times, 
less dense, network structures (Ostrom, 2010). In recent decades, watershed partnership 
approaches toward designing and implementing policy solutions have become more com-
mon (Lubell & Fulton, 2007; Sabatier, Leach, et al., 2005; Sabatier, Weible, et al., 2005). 
Empirical comparisons of watershed partnerships have tended to focus on the composi-
tion of partnership characteristics and their inferred relationship to performance goals 
(Koontz et al., 2004; Imperial, 2005). Partnership networks exist to carry out a broader 
range of policy functions: pooling resources, disseminating information, and otherwise 
aligning interests with public policy needs. In the case of the study undertaken here, these 
functions are carried out through the operations of the Lake Champlain Basin Program 
(LCBP, 2014) and its network of stakeholders. The LCBP serves as the network adminis-
trative organization (NAO) (Provan & Kenis, 2008) or backbone organization of a multi- 
jurisdictional watershed partnership that issues comprehensive watershed management 
plans for the entire basin every five years. The partnership plan to be studied here is the 
2010 Opportunity for Action (OFA).
It is hypothesized that the structural characteristics of the two different planning net-
works in this study can serve as a predictor of their planned network characteristics. More 
specifically, this paper asks to what extent the more centralized structure of the regulatory 
network replicates this structure in the plan that it creates? The “network structure isomor-
phism” hypothesis for this study is stated below as:
H1: The planned network designed by the TMDL regulatory network will exhibit more central-
ized and denser network properties than those designed by the LCBP partnership network.
It has become widely accepted that the selection and use of a policy tool can shape 
the structure of a governance network by giving form to certain types of relational ties, 
and by determining the types of tasks to be undertaken up by specific network actors 
(Salamon, 2002; Bressers & O’Toole, 2005; Howlett, 2005; Koliba, Meek, & Zia, 2010). 
Regulatory tools give structure to principal-agent ties where a regulatory authority has 
some measure of power over others.
The regulatory policy tools identified in this study include: environmental and eco-
nomic regulation, and permits. More collaboratively-oriented policy tools also persist. 
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Public information as a policy strategy ultimately relies on the diffusion of information 
through social networks (Weiss, 2002) that rely on a willingness to consume and distrib-
ute information. A range of other policy tools has been identified across the literature 
(Salamon, 2002; Howlett, 2005; Birkland, 2001) that tend to perpetuate some combina-
tion of principal-agent and collaborative ties. These “mixed tie” policy tools include: 
contracts, grants, loans and guarantees and tax incentives, all of which are coded for in 
this study. 
Building on the relationship between policy tool structure and governance arrange-
ments implied in this literature, a second hypothesis is posed that examines how regulatory 
authority is reified and passed on in the form of regulatory policy tools. It is expected that 
the regulatory network will recommend more regulatory policies (such as environmen-
tal and economic regulation, and permits) than the partnership network, which will tend 
to recommend policy tools that perpetuate the use of collaborative ties, (such as public 
information, as well as other “mixed ties” tools such as grants, contracts, and loans and 
guarantees). This “policy tool isomorphism” hypothesis is stated below as:
H2: Planned networks designed by the TMDL network will recommend a higher percentage of 
regulatory tools than the LCBP network.
To carry out this comparative analysis, a governance network analysis framework 
(Koliba et al., 2011) is used and is summarized in the table below (see Table 1). A “gov-
ernance network” is defined as a relatively stable pattern of coordinated action and 
resource exchanges involving policy actors crossing different social scales, which are 
drawn from the public, private, or non-profit sectors and across geographic levels. These 
actors interact through a variety of competitive, command and control, cooperative, 
and negotiated arrangements for purposes anchored in one or more facets of the policy 
stream (p. 53). Key elements of governance network analysis framework to be explained 
here include: 1) the policy functions that the network takes (problem formation, policy 
design, policy implementation, policy evaluation) (Bovaird, 2005); 2) the policy tools 
that shape the design process and appear in policy plans (Salamon, 2002); 3) the sectoral 
and jurisdictional composition of the actors in the network; and 4) the task structures that 
are assigned to actors in these plans. Table 1 (below) lays out these parameters along with 
highlighted notes.
These governance network variables and parameters are used to describe the patterns 
of interaction of both plans, and examine the two isomorphism hypotheses introduced at the 
beginning of the article. The next section describes the methods used to undertake this analysis. 
2. Methods
This study integrates institutional network analysis, text data mining, and qualitative 
case study research, along with elements of the governance network framework described 
above. Comparative case study analysis methods were used to compare the two plan-
ning networks. A combination of stakeholder interviews, source document analysis, and 
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participant observation were triangulated to discern the network governance structures 
of the two planning networks. These qualitative data were coded for critical events that 
informed the design of each of the two plans under study. Visualizations of these policy 
design networks were rendered from these qualitative assessments (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Figure 1. TMDL Policy Design Network Governance Structure for the 2010 
 Vermont TMDL
Figure 2. Lake Champlain Basin Program Governance Structure
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Instititional network analysis techniques are used to describe and evaluate the net-
works of institutions found in the planning documents created by the TMDL and OFA 
planning networks. The application of instititional network analysis techniques to the 
study of governance networks has become widely adopted following the pioneering 
application of social network analysis to emergency management by Comfort (2002, 
2007) and Kapucu (2006a, b). These applications have been used to study the jurisdic-
tional and sectoral composition of institutional actors. In at least one case, institutional 
network analysis has been used to study the fidelity of implemented emergency man-
agement responses to those found in national emergency management plans (Kapucu & 
Demiroz, 2011). This study builds on Comfort and Kapucu’s approaches to textual data 
mining to code for actors, but we deepen this methodology by adding a network layer 
of “task structures” that appear in planning documents and contain a significant level of 
detail in them. 
A task structure is defined here as those bimodal relationships between two or more 
actors united around a common task. The combination of these bimodal relationships form 
patterns of network structure that may be described, compared, and contrasted. In highly 
structured planning documents like the ones studied here, policy recommendations may 
be accompanied by more detailed implementation strategies that identify who is to intiate 
a given task and who is to respond to the intiation to carry out the task. In strategies where 
actors are explicitly identified, a network structure is inferred to represent the planned re-
lationships among these actors. *ORA software (Carley, 2001–2011) was used for matrix 
algebra and metric calculation. The network visuals were generated in UCINET (Borgatti, 
Everett, & Freeman, 2002). Measures of network density, nodal centrality, betweenness 
and eigenvector values are generated. 
3. The Governance of Phosphorus Loading in Lake Champlain
The networks studied here share a common policy aim and geographic context: to 
protect and manage water quality in the Lake Champlain Basin, located on the boarder 
of Vermont, New York and Quebec. Both sets of networks rely on the same shared data 
regarding the scope, scale and causes of nutrient loading into Lake Champlain. Both sets 
of networks were born from a shared concern for the impacts of this nutrient loading on 
water quality in the lake, particularly the significant algae blooms that comprise water 
quality for drinking, swimming and other forms of recreation. 
Although land use contributors to phosphorus loading in the Lake Champlain Basin 
vary across the region, Vermont contributes the majority of phosphorus loads to Lake 
Champlain (LCBP, 2008). This variation in loading responsibility between land use types, 
as well as the cross-jurisdictional complexity of two state (VT and NY) regions and one 
province (Quebec) region, prevents the use of blanket regulatory approaches, making the 
situation ripe for collaborative watershed management. In the sections to follow, a descrip-
tion of the regulatory and partnership networks that have been established to mitigate the 
flow of phosphorus pollution into the lake is provided.
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3.1. 2010 TMDL Regulatory Planning Network 
The regulatory authority of the USEPA dominates the regulatory network (see 
Figure 1). In section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act, the USEPA requires all states to 
identify waters that are “impaired,” that is, which do not meet the state water quality 
standards. Once identified, states must analyze and set Total Maximum Daily Load 
(TMDL) targets for each pollutant to the water body. TMDLs must include: (1) an 
estimate of pollutant loads from all significant point and non-point sources; (2) a link 
between pollutant sources and their impacts on water quality; (3) allocation of allow-
able pollutant loads among sources; (4) actions for achieving Water Quality Standards; 
and (5) opportunities for public participation (USEPA, 1991). In this way, the USEPA 
establishes limits for pollutant levels and places a burden on the state to reduce those 
levels. Vermont was issued a TMDL directed at nonpoint source pollution into Lake 
Champlain in 2002. Following a lawsuit filed by the Conservation Law Foundation in 
2008, the 2002 TMDL was pressured to be withdrawn and replaced with a more robust 
plan. The 2002 TMDL was officially rejected by the USEPA in 2011.
The 2010 TMDL plan was developed under the assumption that the 2002 TMDL 
may be rejected by the USEPA. Catalyzed into action as a result of the lawsuit, the Ver-
mont State Legislature directed the VT ANR to work with the Vermont Agency of Agricul-
ture, Food, and Markets (AAFM) and other state agencies to design this implementation 
plan as a way to stave off a rejection of the 2002 TMDL. Figure 1 provides a visualization 
for the multi-institutional context for the creation of the 2010 TMDL plan, with the ANR 
serving as a lead organization in a collaborative planning process that included extensive 
consultation with the public at large, special interest groups and other state agencies. This 
network catalyzed as a result of mandate derived directly through the VT State Legislature 
and indirectly through the regulatory authority of the USEPA. These regulatory pressures 
held the lead organization, the ANR, as chiefly responsible for devising a suitable plan. 
The extent to which these coercive pressures were translated in the plan chiefly devised by 
the ANR is the subject of this particular study. 
3.2. 2010 OFA Partnership Planning Network
The LCBP is designed along the “management conference” model of watershed 
management (Koontz et al., 2004), in which a network administrative organization is 
created to generate and manage knowledge about watershed health for adaptive manage-
ment purposes. An act of Congress led to the passage of the Lake Champlain Special 
Designation Act of 1990 (Public Law 101–596, 1990), sponsored by US Senators from 
both New York and Vermont, created the LCBP.1 The governments of Vermont, New York 
and Quebec entered into a partnership facilitated through the LCBP Steering Committee 
(LCSC) and citizens’ advisory committees to craft a science-based action plan entitled 
“Opportunities for Action” (OFA) (LCBP, 2010). The LCBP does not have regulatory 
1 The LCBP is also known as the Lake Champlain Management Conference (LCMC).
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authority, but rather sponsors research, manages grant programs, provides educational 
outreach, convenes public meetings, and compiles watershed data and maps into a com-
prehensive atlas (LCBP, 2014).
By design, the LCBP is an organization deeply involved in the coordination of a 
partnership network and serves as a classic network administrative organization (Provan 
& Kenis, 2008). The LCBP is administered jointly by several agencies: USEPA Regions 
I and II; New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYS DEC); VT 
ANR; Quebec Ministry of Environment; and New England Interstate Water Pollution 
Control Commission (NEIWPCC). Administration is carried out by a professional staff, 
some of whom have shared reporting roles with state, provincial, and federal agencies. 
The LCSC guides the program’s policy and planning activities and serves an executive 
role in a network of committees that includes a CAC from each jurisdiction (Vermont, 
New York and Quebec), as well as a technical advisory committee (TAC), an education 
and outreach committee, and a cultural heritage and recreation advisory committee. This 
network of committees, shown in Figure 2 below, creates a management structure that 
is not centrally administered, but rather built on collaboration between many actors that 
participate in both decision-making and implementation.
Every seven years, a new OFA report is issued by the LCBP, which offers policy 
recommendations designed to improve water quality in the basin. Topical foci in the OFA 
extend beyond nutrient loading to include control of invasive species, management of fish-
eries, and so on. For the purposes of this analysis, only the portions of the OFA addressing 
nutrient management in the lake are included in the analysis. Drafts of plans are vetted in 
open committee meetings and public hearings along with other citizen engagement activi-
ties. The OFA plan is informed by a broad range of actors who have repeated opportunities 
to inform its final version.
It is important to note that the USEPA mandates the institution of approved TMDL 
plans for all impaired watersheds. USEPA is responsible for assuring some form of 
regulatory compliance over state and local jurisdictions. While the LCBP watershed 
partnership OFA plans have no legal authority per se, and carry the weight of recom-
mendations and research funding authority. These are two distinctions that we are to 
return to later.
4. Comparing the 2010 TMDL Plan and the 2010 OFA Plan 
The comparative analysis of the two planned networks begins with an analysis of 
the suite of policy tools assigned to mitigate different land use behaviors contributing to 
phosphorus runoff. A description of the network actors by sector and jurisdiction found 
in each plan is then rendered. Task structures in both plans are then described as patterns 
of initiating and implementing actor assignments. The section concludes with a compara-
tive analysis of both planned networks, comparing both node-level and whole network 
properties.
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4.1. Policy Tool Ascription by Land Use 
Phosphorus loading levels into Lake Champlain are strongly tied to the composi-
tion of agricultural, development (residential and commercial), and forestry land uses in 
the region (Troy et al., 2007). Table 2 (below) demonstrates how the TMDL plan identi-
fies 249 tasks, roughly 87% of which indicate a policy tool to be used. The OFA plan 
identifies 192 tasks, 99% of which indicate a policy tool. While this represents a greater 
detail in planning in the OFA than the TMDL plan, the OFA applies a smaller range of 
tools. The OFA identifies five different policy tools, while the TMDL plan identifies 
eight. Public information is the most dominant tool in both plans, accounting for more 
than half of the identified tools in each plan, with environmental regulation and grants 
recommendations the next most prevalent policy tools in both plans. Both plans apply 
permits and contracts, but only to a lesser extent. Three tools appear only in the TMDL 
plan: economic regulation, loans and guarantees, and tax incentives. 
Comparison of these results suggests that the mix of policy tools is similar in both 
plans. 
In reviewing the dominant policy tool selection, public information is the most used 
tool in all the land-use domains. The second most identified policy tool is environmental 
regulation, mostly used to address agriculture and development land use issues. 
4.2. Actor Characteristics
The composition of actors within both plans is shown in Table 3 and 4, differentiated 
by actor jurisdiction and sector. The patterns found in Table 3 (below) should come as no 
surprise, as they reflect the differences in geographic scope of the regulatory (Vermont) 
and partnership (Vermont, New York and Quebec) networks. 
Table 2
Strategic Profile by Use of Policy Tools
OFA
(192 tasks)
TMDL
(249 tasks)
Count Percent Count Percent
Economic Regulation 0 0.0 1 0.4
Environmental Regulation 42 21.9 48 19.3
Permits 9 4.7 14 5.6
Public Information 100 52.1 135 54.2
Contracts 6 3.1 6 2.4
Grants 35 18.2 36 14.5
Loan Guarantees 0 0.0 7 2.8
Tax Incentives 0 0.0 2 0.8
Policy Tools Utilized 192 100.0 249 100.0
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Table 3
Frequency of Jurisdiction Attribute Values
Category
TMDL OFA
Count Percentage Count Percentage
Vermont 12 25.53 15 21.13%
New York  0 0.00%  9 12.68%
Quebec  0 0.00%  4 5.63%
U.S.  8 17.02% 12 16.90%
Canada  0 0.00%  0 0.00%
International  1 2.13%  3 4.23%
Multiple or Indeterminate 26 55.32% 28 39.44%
Total 47 100% 71 100%
Table 4
Frequency of Sector Attribute Values
Category
TMDL OFA
Count Percentage Count Percentage
Federal Government  8 17.02%  9 12.68%
State/Province Government  9 19.15% 10 14.08%
Regional Government  4 8.51%  1 1.41%
Local Government  6 12.77% 21 29.58%
Private Enterprise  7 14.89% 11 15.49%
NGO/Non-Profit  5 10.64% 10 14.08%
Citizen  6 12.77%  5 7.04%
Researcher  2 4.26%  3 4.23%
International Governing Body  0 0.00%  1 1.41%
Total 47 100% 71 100%
A review of the distribution of actors by sector (table 4 below) reveals some differ-
ences in plan composition. Overall, government actors dominate both plans, represent-
ing 56.25% of actors in the TMDL and 55.55% of actors in the OFA. However, while 
the TMDL plan demonstrates a preponderance of state-level agencies, the OFA shows a 
stronger emphasis on local government. Reliance on the remaining sectors is remarkably 
similar in both plans.
4.3. Network Properties and Structural Patterns
The networks extracted from these two reified plans demonstrate structures that 
emerge from formal planning processes. Measures of node relationships and network con-
nectivity help to illuminate patterns seen in Figures 3 and 4. A visual review of these 
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Figure 3. Designed network for a phosphorus reduction network found in the TMDL plan
Figure 4. Designed network for a phosphorus reduction network found in the OFA plan
two figures shows the TMDL planned network is distributed as a star network organized 
around the VT ANR and municipalities (a class node), along with several isolate actors 
that have no ties. The OFA planned network exhibits a more distributed structure with a 
series of bridging organizations that link jurisdictional clusters of actors, notably the ridge 
of federal agencies connecting the states of New York and Vermont.
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Centralization measures the extent to which a network approaches a perfect star 
structure. Table 5 shows greater degree of centralization in the TMDL network than in the 
OFA network. This is shown visually in Figures 3 and 4 in which there are several hub 
nodes in the OFA, while in the TMDL network there is but a single central node. Greater 
fragmentation in the TMDL is witnessed as a subset of highly connected actors that are 
centralized into one component while several others remain isolated. This is quite dif-
ferent from the OFA, which incorporates all of the actors into the connected component 
through a set of regional hubs. These characteristics are quantified in the comparison of 
isolate count, fragmentation scores, and levels of degree, betweenness, and eigenvector 
centralization (see Table 5). These patterns all point to a more centralized, but also more 
fragmented, TMDL network.
A review of the top nodal actors by centrality measures (table 6) of the 2010 TMDL 
plan shows that the VT ANR possesses the greatest number of ties (degree centrality) and 
has the most relationships to other highly-connected nodes (eigenvector centrality). Ac-
cording to this design, ANR will broker with many other actors directly to carry out plan 
functions. In contrast, the OFA relies on several nodes for brokering (Vermont, New York, 
Quebec, LCSG, LCBP, USEPA) (see table 7). 
Table 5
Network characteristics
TMDL OFA
Node Count 47 71
Component Count 22 1
Isolate Count 20 0
Fragmentation 0.722 0.00
Degree Centralization 0.084 0.244
Eigenvector Centralization 0.548 0.593
Table 6
Ten Most Central Organizations in the TMDL Network
Degree Centrality Eigenvector Centrality
VT ANR 0.097 VTANR 0.646
Municipalities 0.097 Municipalities 0.610
VLCT 0.043 Homeowners 0.448
Homeowners 0.043 RPCs 0.408
Developers 0.043 VLCT 0.408
RPCs 0.043 Developers 0.386
SWCDs 0.043 SWCDs 0.346
Town Road Crews 0.043 Landowners 0.246
Federal Agencies 0.032 Federal Agencies 0.213
VTrans 0.022 State Agencies 0.213
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Several actors are present in both tables, indicating their centrality to both plans. An 
example is the “municipalities” class node that is primarily identified as an implementing 
actor. Its centrality indicates that the node is targeted by a range of interventions in both 
plans. A similar node, “farmers,” is highly central in the OFA, but does not appear as a 
top node in the TMDL plan. This reflects the TMDL plan’s reliance on AAFM as a bu-
reaucratic channel to address agriculture, while the OFA utilized a more varied approach.
5. Network and Policy Tool Isomorphism
This analysis suggests some mixed results regarding the two network isomorphism 
hypotheses. In the 2010 TMDL planned network (Figure 5), the largest assemblage of the 
network is a highly dense cluster of actors with relatively high number of connections, 
while the remainder of the graph is highly fragmented, including many isolates. As noted, 
the design of the 2010 TMDL plan was led primarily by the VT ANR. The evidence pre-
sented here suggests that the same monocentric structure that shaped the planning network 
appears in the planned network, with ANR as the central locus of initiating activity. While 
a visual inspection of the 2010 OFA (Figure 6) reveals a spine of federal agencies linked 
to two main hubs—Vermont and New York—with four smaller hubs: Quebec, the LCBP, 
the USEPA, and Lake Champlain Sea Grant (LCSG). Given the visual evidence and the 
comparative centrality scores found in Table 6, it appears that there is sufficient reason to 
affirm the H1 presented earlier: the regulatory network embodied in the regulatory net-
work produced a more centralized planned network structure. 
Interestingly, in follow up conversations with the lead author of the 2010 TMDL 
plan, there was a concerted effort to decenter ANR as the center piece of the plan. 
Although ANR serves as the most central hub in the planned network, its centrality is tem-
pered somewhat by the intentional efforts of the lead author (the then head of the Clean 
and Clear Program) to collectivize responsibility for phosphorus reduction.
Table 7
Ten Most Central Organizations in the OFA Network
Degree Centrality Eigenvector Centrality
Vermont 0.257 Vermont 0.694
New York 0.243 New York 0.683
Quebec 0.064 Farmers 0.348
LCBP 0.064 USDA-NRCS 0.289
LCSG 0.057 USFWS 0.264
USEPA 0.050 LCBP 0.260
Farmers 0.050 USEPA 0.238
USDA-NRCS 0.043 Municipalities 0.227
USFWS 0.043 Quebec 0.225
Municipalities 0.029 WRPs 0.218
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Looking at the distribution of policy tools found in each plan (see Table 2), a more 
complex picture of policy tool distribution is painted. The more coercive regulatory policy 
tools that were coded for (economic regulation, environmental regulation, and permitting) 
accounted for 21.91% of the policy tools identified in the 2010 OFA and just 19.3% of 
the policy tools identified in the 2010 TMDL plan. This distribution suggests that H2 is 
not proven and that, in fact, the overall distribution of policy tools within each of the two 
plans is remarkably similar, suggesting here that a predisposition toward some policy 
tools over others prevails across both networks. We provide some possible explanations 
for this below.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) distinguish between three types of institutional iso-
morphism. Coercive isomorphism is associated with pressures bought on by regulation, le-
gal sanction, or mandate, whereby organizations adopt certain structures and functions to 
accommodate regulatory, legal, or bureaucratic compliance. Mimetic isomorphism is said 
to arise under uncertainty when risk may be reduced by copying pre-existing, presumably 
successful, organizational forms. Normative isomorphism is driven by professional stan-
dards and expectations regarding best practices and high performance. All three drivers of 
isomorphic behavior may be in play here to explain both observed phenomena: evidence 
of network structure isomorphism at the level of perpetuation of regulatory and partner-
ship network structure; and, the lack of evidence to assert that policy tool isomorphism 
persists across partnership or regulatory network forms.
The origins of the 2010 TMDL planning networks originated through legislative 
mandate, a source of coercive isomorphic pressure. Existing federal level TMDL legisla-
tion (appearing in the 1987 amendment to the Clean Water Act) outlines a centralized 
design model in which states are required to draft management plans to be approved by 
the USEPA. Designees of each state are then presumed to assume a central role. Greater 
coercive pressure is at play in the TMDL network. The Clean and Clear Program of the 
VT ANR at the time was mandated by the Vermont State Legislature to develop an imple-
mentation plan for the original 2002 TMDL. USEPA pressures to achieve benchmarks 
for phosphorous loading may have encouraged the use of a lead organization network 
structure, where a clear line of accountably can be drawn to ANR. Coercive isomorphism 
appears in planned networks when and where formal or informal expectations are laid out 
by principals and provided to agents to carry out plans. 
However, the expectations of the principals overseeing the planning networks’ ac-
tivities (USEPA, Vermont State Legislature, and the principal parties to the governance of 
the LCBP) over the selection of policy tools used to address the problem of phosphorus 
loading into Lake Champlain appear to be very similar. It may suggest that other network 
ties are at work across the region that have been not accounted for in the current study. 
It may also arise out of a common set of interest groups and network actors appearing in 
both the regulatory and partnership networks. For example, municipalities, which are the 
main locus of land use zoning in Vermont and New York, play a prominent feature in both 
plans. Local control over land use decision making may be a tacit assumption driving the 
homogeneity of policy tool choice. Deeper examination of these factors is called for.
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It is likely that some form of mimicry is at work to explain the isomorphism present. 
Mimicry occurs when best practices are proffered by planners, policy makers and thought 
leaders within a given field. These best practices strategies may be drawn from other wa-
tershed regions, practices thought to be most effective, and/or practices that have been 
undertaken in the past. It should also be noted that nonpoint source pollution, whether it is 
focused on mitigating agricultural runoff or storm water runoff from development, is said 
to be best addressed through a professionally determined set of best management practices 
(BMPs). These BMPs are promulgated through professional networks that have evolved 
among environmental engineers, agronomists, and watershed management professionals. 
These same professionals staff the committees and programs charged with drafting these 
plans. The dissemination of BMPs may be described as a form of mimicry. Thus, mimicry 
appears to be in place in the standard accepted practices established for watershed man-
agement and governance, and may be a major factor in explaining the homogeneity in the 
selection of policy tools in both plans. In the context of plan development phases in both 
networks, best management practices for stormwater and agriculture run-off were widely 
shared and examined among water quality experts drawn from the public, private, and 
nonprofit sectors. 
Normative isomorphism may be found in the translation of common norms, values, 
and beliefs between key stakeholders. The implementation plans that were created and 
vetted through both networks were subject to substantial dialogue and debate. Both plan-
ning processes preferred to rely on a consensus of a core group of stakeholders whose 
perspectives were informed through lengthy public input, peer review, and negotiation. 
It has been noted how recent environmental governance and management approaches 
have tended to avoid the utilization of command and control regulatory approaches (Ger-
lak, 2006) and instead rely on more reflexive strategies (Fiorino, 1999). These reflex-
ive strategies surface in the stronger deference to the use of incentives and market-based 
mechanisms in both plans. 
Several key actors in the Lake Champlain Basin were participants in both planning 
networks. In follow up discussions with the lead author of the 2010 TMDL plan sheds 
particular light on this subject. When asked about the apparent similarities between the 
2010 TMDL plan and the 2010 OFA she remarked that the overlaps in the plans were 
likely the result of having some of the same lead actors in designing the plans partici-
pating in the same planning meetings. In other words, there was an intentional effort to 
align the plans together. This observation demonstrates the role of that individual network 
managers may take, when positioned right, in steering the overall composition of an 
implementation plan. 
6. Conclusions
This study presents the first time that a regulatory network and a partnership planning 
network focusing on the same environmental problem—operating within similar jurisdic-
tional regions, and functioning at the same point in time—have been studied. Institutional 
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network analysis was used to compare the two plans resulting from these two planning 
networks. The results of this study suggest that institutional isomorphism theory can be 
applied to the study of multi-institutional networks and that it may be useful to explain 
how networks evolve from one stage of development to another. 
In order to deepen our understanding of network isomorphism it will be essential 
to render a more robust comparative analysis of a network’s evolution over time using 
consistent institutional network analysis methods for comparative purposes. In the present 
study, the informational asymmetry between the qualitative description of the planning 
networks and a statistical description of the planned networks is acknowledged. 
The methods of institutional network analysis advanced here allow for the mapping of 
networks reified in formal plans in a manner that accounts for initiating and implementing 
actors. Our methods advance the field’s capacity to measure plan characteristics, including 
ways that document sectors and jurisdictions, policy tools for achieving outcome goals, and 
task structures. The task structure framework found in Figures 1 can be applied to other 
types of plans, reports, and detailed descriptions of implementation tasks that offer signifi-
cant details about actors and policy tools. When used as a decision support, these measures 
can clarify the structural needs of proposed actions and indicate plan weaknesses prior to 
implementation. In this way it can help align policy structures with contextual constraints 
and provide insight into the role that plans play in policy implementation.
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